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Abstract
In this paper, we integrate the identity of legislators in a politico-economic analysis
of parliamentary oversight whereby oversight activities depend on individual control costs
and incentives. We focus on public servants selected into parliament who face a conflict of
interests but also have lower control costs due to their experience and information advantage.
If held accountable, oversight becomes a relatively attractive activity for them to win votes.
Based on a novel data set for German Laender, we find that the fraction of public servants
in parliament is positively related to the number of submitted parliamentary interpellations.
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The oversight of the government and the subordinate public service is one of the constitutional
core duties of the members of parliament in a democracy. It is a key aspect of the checks
and balances in a system adhering to the principle of the separation of powers. Parliamentary
oversight is instituted to restrict the abuse of government authority and to maintain incentives
to efficiently provide public goods and services. Even though economists and political scientists
alike emphasize the importance of (parliamentary) oversight to hold governments accountable,
it is more often than not abstracted from the actual parliamentary control process in scientific
work.1
In this paper, we intend to contribute to a better understanding of the parliamentary over-
sight process in three directions. First, we explicitly study the use of parliamentary control
instruments. Second, we consider parliamentary control as the result of political selection and
of the institutional structure determining political competition. Third, with regard to political
selection, we focus on the role of public servants as legislators in parliamentary control. We un-
derstand political selection as the process and the result of any systematic effect of institutions
on the composition of political bodies in terms of the individual characteristics of its members.
As to parliamentary control, political selection affects the composition of the legislature in terms
of its members’ individual control costs and individual motivation. The two aspects are difficult
to separate though. The cost of control efforts can be lower due to skills, knowledge, an infor-
mation advantage or a specific motivation to control (e.g., due to public service motivation or
civic duty, etc.).
We argue that the selection of public servants into legislatures is of particular interest for under-
standing how political selection affects parliamentary oversight. First, parliaments across the
world differ widely in the fraction of (former) public servants in their compositional structure.
In the United States or the United Kingdom, there are relatively few former public servants in
the national parliament as they are ineligible to run for a seat. In contrast, in the legislatures
of Austria or Germany, for example, the share of public servants has often reached more than
forty percent since World War II. Second, public servants might systematically differ in terms of
their individual cost and motivation for parliamentary control. On the one hand, the selection
of public servants to the legislature can serve as a check. If the information asymmetry between
the public service and the legislature is severe (as, e.g., pointed out by Niskanen 1971), electing
insiders to parliament who become accountable to the electorate might help to align interests
between principals and agents. Public servants in parliament who dispose of an information
1For our purpose, we use the terms of parliamentary control, oversight, and monitoring
interchangeably. For descriptions of oversight see, e.g., Rosenthal (1981) and Patzelt (2005).
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advantage with respect to public service issues and who face lower control costs enhance the
monitoring competence of the elected assemblies. On the other hand, public servants in parlia-
ment compromise the principle of the (personal) separation of powers and thus face a conflict
of interests. This is due to their double role as agents in public service and as principals that
supervise the public service in parliament.
As a consequence, the question arises whether the specific motivation and individual control
costs of public servants in parliament lead to more or less parliamentary oversight for a given
level of political competition. We study this question for the institutional context of Germany
and its sixteen Laender (as the federal states are called). We do this for mainly two reasons:
First, parliamentary control of the government and its subordinate public service is a main task
of the members of parliament in the German Laender. Most new law is enacted on the federal
level while the Laender have to implement and administer it. Second, members of parliament
with a public sector background are a striking feature of politics in Germany. For instance in
1988, no less than 61.6 percent of the seats in parliament in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg were held by
public servants. In our analysis, we take into account further aspects determining parliamentary
oversight. In particular, we investigate how the electoral system, new parties and the form of
government affect parliamentary control.
With respect to the instruments of parliamentary control, we focus on the most widespread
instruments; i.e., major and minor interpellations and oral inquiries. By asking for detailed
information and evaluations with regard to the efficient use of public funds, interpellations
critically control government behavior. Information about the use of these control instruments
is publicly available, subject to media attention, individually attributable and thus relevant for
constituents’ evaluations of a politician’s performance. Consequently, we take the use of these
instruments to be positively related to the strictness of parliamentary oversight.
For the empirical analysis, a unique time-series cross-sectional data set has been compiled cov-
ering three different quantitative measures of parliamentary control, spanning the period from
1946 to 2009. Additionally, we gathered data on the fraction of public servants elected to par-
liament and collected information on the form of government, the electoral system, new parties,
and the length of legislative periods.
We find a positive correlation between the political selection variable; i.e., the fraction of public
servants in parliament, and the number of parliamentary inquiries submitted. This holds in
particular for minor interpellations; i.e., the main individual control instrument for efficiency
control. Interestingly, this effect for minor interpellations is larger in Laender where a fraction of
the legislature is elected through a majoritarian procedure (rather than through a proportional
procedure). A majoritarian procedure in a mixed-member electoral system is understood to
increase political competition as individual candidates can be held accountable by the electorate.
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This is in line with a generally positive level effect of a mixed-member electoral system on the
number of parliamentary inquiries. Furthermore, coalition governments by major parties are
positively correlated with the number of parliamentary inquiries submitted.
This study contributes to the research on the consequences of political selection processes and
on the comparative institutional analysis of parliamentary control. With regard to the former
aspect, related recent empirical and theoretical work has been conducted by researchers such
as Besley (2005), Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2008), Gagliarducci et al. (2010), Caselli and
Morelli (2004), Galasso and Nannicini (2009), and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004). As to par-
liamentary oversight, this is related to the (often US-specific) analysis of oversight relationships
and bargaining processes between the bureaucracy and the legislator (Banks and Weingast 1992,
Calvert et al. 1989, Moe 1989, Niskanen 1971, 1975, Ogul and Rockman 1990, Rosenthal 1981,
Weingast and Moran 1983), the (legislative) design of administrative procedures and ex ante
control (McCubbins et al. 1987 and Bawn 1995, 1997), and the separation of powers (Persson
et al. 1997, Grossman and Helpman 2008). Our analysis also contributes to the limited body of
research on the effectiveness of legislators (Shiller 1995, Padro i Miguel and Snyder 2006, Grant
and Kelly 2008), and the German political science literature dealing with state legislatures and
governmental-parliamentary relationships (Holtmann and Patzelt 2004, Patzelt 2005).
Section 2 presents the main theoretical arguments about the incentives for parliamentary control
with a focus on public servants elected to parliament. The arguments are complemented with
a brief discussion on further relevant determinants of parliamentary oversight, in particular the
electoral system. Section 3 deals with the German institutional background. The empirical
analysis is presented in Section 4. A detailed description of the compiled database is followed by
an econometric analysis of the partial correlations between the variables for political selection
and institutional characteristics and the measures of parliamentary control. Section 5 offers
concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Considerations
The institutional structure shapes the incentives of the members of parliament to execute par-
liamentary oversight. Differences in motivations and skills influence their ability and individual
costs to effectively control the executive bodies. In this section, we first briefly explain the im-
portance of parliamentary oversight for the democratic process. Second, we discuss politicians’
incentives, trade-offs and individual costs when deciding about resources to invest in parliamen-
tary control. This framework is, third, extended to the case of parliamentarians with a public
service background. We consider their occupational backgrounds as an important determinant of
economic interests and control costs. Fourth, we take into account some additional institutional
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factors affecting parliamentary oversight. Finally, the theoretical arguments are summarized in
a set of hypotheses.
2.1 Relevance of Parliamentary Oversight
A major constitutional principle in a democracy is the separation of powers sustained by a set
of checks and balances. This is expected to ensure a responsible executive branch. One primary
check that falls within the responsibility of the legislature is the control of the government on
behalf of the citizens.2 The oversight function implies first and foremost the prevention, the de-
tection and the restriction of discretionary executive abuse. The goal is to increase transparency
of government behavior. Second, oversight is meant to ensure that policies announced by the
government and authorized by parliament are properly implemented. This involves an efficiency
control. Finally, oversight involves the critical examination of government proposals. This is
often referred to as political control with respect to the (partisan) direction in which policies
are developed. Overall, there is the idea that strict parliamentary oversight ensures a responsive
government and thus an efficient provision of services by the subordinate public agencies.3
2.2 Incentives for Parliamentary Oversight
There are several arguments why legislators have at best moderate incentives to strictly control
government behavior despite their constitutional mandate. First, strict oversight has a strong
public good dimension within the legislature. Monitoring benefits the whole population and
rarely favors single districts or narrowly targeted groups so that it would become individually
attractive (e.g., Weingast 1984). Second, monitoring is largely ineffective because the public
ministerial administration has a clear informational advantage regarding the costs of producing
public services (Niskanen 1971). In particular, the lack of organizational structure and staff
resources (Rosenthal 1981) as well as the longer time horizon of public ministerial agencies
create a situation where the administration dominates parliament rather than being seriously
supervised by it. Moreover, parliamentary attention tends to be sporadic and is often motivated
by some scandal calling for control only subsequent to the event (Weingast 1984).
However, there are also incentives encouraging parliamentary oversight. This is taken as self-
evident in the literature on the congressional dominance model (e.g., Calvert et al. 1989, Banks
2In political science, parliamentary functions are often separated into a legislative function,
an oversight function, an elective function and a publicity function (Patzelt 2006).
3To perform the oversight mandate, parliaments have various tools at hand. For a compara-
tive survey on oversight instruments in national parliaments see Yamamoto (2007) and Wiberg
(1995).
4
1989, and Ferejohn and Krehbiel 1987). Politicians spent time on campaigning, legislating,
services to district constituents, earning outside income and oversight.4 In order to win votes,
politicians invest time in those activities that offer the highest political returns. For politicians
with the relevant political expertise, oversight is an activity that helps them to distinguish
themselves from other politicians in the competition for votes. Oversight expertise is acquired
during a political career and in previous or current professions. (Aggressive) monitoring is further
stimulated by media coverage since it is pursued to attract public attention and to increase one’s
reputation. However, the promotional advantages of publicity regarding good government and
an efficient provision of public goods are limited. Stricter oversight is also expected if the (local)
constituency complains about the public provision of goods and services. Constituents reduce
the information costs of monitoring by reporting to their representatives. This is particularly
relevant if there are well organized interest groups in the politician’s district that have sufficient
resources and strong incentives to keep a watchful eye on public service behavior (Banks and
Weingast 1992).
Several of the previous arguments hint at the role of political competition in shaping the individ-
ual politician’s cost-benefit calculus. If competitive pressure is stronger, politicians are expected
to engage more often in oversight activity.
A further factor motivating oversight goes beyond narrow self-interest and refers to a duty
of care and a duty of loyalty (similar to the fiduciary duties of trustees).5 This form of in-
trinsic motivation is of particular relevance if structural opportunities for oversight are weak.
Structural opportunities thereby refer to staff resources, professionalization, public auditing,
specialized committees, the duty to give information following parliamentary inquiries and the
legal authority to compel.
It is self-evident that the different arguments are more or less relevant for individual politicians
in shaping their incentives to engage in parliamentary oversight. There are individual differences
in the cost benefit calculus. Political selection emphasizes this heterogeneity in the pool of people
pursuing a political mandate. Politicians are expected to react in a systematically different way
to a given level of political competition depending on their individual characteristics. With
regard to parliamentary oversight, the individual control costs are of particular importance.
Legislators with better knowledge about the functioning of the public service and better access
to information about the provision of public goods and public services have relatively lower costs
4For a discussion about outside earnings and absenteeism, see Gagliarducci et al. (2010), for
a discussion of outside earnings and electoral competition, see Becker et al. (2009), and for a
comprehensive overview about politicians’ outside earnings see Diermeier et al. (2005) for the
US Congress and Merlo et al. (2008) for the Italian parliament.
5A fiduciary model of politicians’ behavior is proposed in Besley (2006).
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for engaging in parliamentary control. The same holds for legislators who are strongly motivated
by a duty of care or loyalty. We follow this line of argument in more detail for public servants.
2.3 Public Servants as Legislators
Public servants in comparison to legislators from the private sector represent a selection of people
in parliament who differ in their incentives, costs and maybe even in their intrinsic motivation
for engaging in parliamentary control.
Cost advantage in parliamentary oversight
Information asymmetries between the public service and the legislature are an obstacle to par-
liamentary oversight. Electing public servants with a high degree of expertise in public service
issues to parliament is expected to attenuate this situation. A first informational advantage
in public service issues consists of specific knowledge about the proper execution of a public
servant’s (previous) function. A second component refers to knowledge about the general func-
tioning of the public service as a whole. This involves familiarity with the efficiency control
executed by the public employer and ultimately by the parliament. It also includes knowledge
about the legal status of public servants; i.e., civil service salary law, civil service career law,
and public services law as well as legal and administrative procedures in general. Consequently,
representatives with a public service background can execute parliamentary control activities at
comparatively lower costs. Accordingly, engaging in oversight is relatively attractive for promot-
ing a parliamentarian’s reputation and thus for winning votes. For example, a parliamentarian
with a public service background is more receptive to his or her constituents’ complaints about
the behavior of (local) public agencies. An informational advantage, first, ensures that the
costs of becoming informed about local public service nuisances are relatively low. Second, the
costs of bringing an issue to parliament by means of parliamentary control instruments (e.g.,
interpellations) are relatively low, as well. If a public servant in parliament does not plan to
return to public service, but intends to pursue a political career until retirement, monitoring
becomes an attractive activity for advancement. The attractiveness of oversight activities is
further increased in a majority voting system, where public servants as legislators are directly
accountable to their constituents. A final argument refers to fiduciary duty. It states that a
career in public service (partially) reflects public service motivation (Frank and Lewis 2004, Le
Grand 2003). If such motivation carries over to behavior in political office, it contributes to a
continuous monitoring of government behavior.
Conflict of interest in parliamentary oversight
Public servants face a conflict of interest due to their double role in public service and in
parliament. This compromises the personal separation of powers. A large proportion of public
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servants in parliament, may be interpreted as embodying a strong and direct representation
of public service interests. As a consequence, the public service enjoys more discretion, which
prejudices the efficient provision of public services. The private interests of public servants lead
to slack that is less forcefully counteracted by legislative control when the latter is pursued by
committees that largely consist of public servants.6 This conflict of interest counteracts the cost
advantage in monitoring discussed above.
In contrast, other conflicts of interest might be weaker. Public servants in parliament enjoy
guaranteed reemployment and favorable terms for leave of absence with respect to time and pay.
These institutional privileges render them relatively more independent of special interests. Other
parliamentarians (e.g., employees of large firms, representatives of trade unions or professional
associations and secretaries of parties) may encounter similar or even more favorable conditions
while holding a mandate. However, they have no legal rights to reclaim the conditions; they
depend on the discretion of their (former) superiors and may be bound to a direct equivalent in
terms of interest representation. In contrast to other members of parliament, public servants can
thus be considered relatively independent from outside pressure and free to dedicate themselves
to parliamentary duties until the end of their political office.
2.4 Additional Determinants of Parliamentary Oversight
Electoral systems and individual accountability
In a pure proportional representation system, where voters choose between party lists, individual
parliamentarians do not face strict electoral accountability (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2005). In
contrast, a majority voting system and a mixed-member electoral system, where at least some
members of parliament are elected on single seats, provide incentives for individual politicians to
distinguish themselves from other parliamentarians or potential competitors and to build up their
reputations as dutiful members of parliament. Accordingly, more frequent use of parliamentary
control instruments is expected.
Parties’ role in parliamentary control
Parties and their parliamentary representation, the factions, often have a constitutional duty to
monitor and actively criticize government behavior. Compared to individual legislators, parties
have a longer time horizon (Alesina and Spear 1988). This enhances their interest in sustained
oversight activity. Accordingly, party leaders provide internal rewards, staff resources and sanc-
tions to induce individual members of parliament to engage in oversight activity (Niskanen
6However, it might be argued that a coordinated behavior of public servants in parliament is
difficult to implement given the heterogeneity of public servants with respect to party affiliation,
branch, function and position within the public service.
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1975). Moreover, (large) parties can specialize internally (Snyder and Ting 2002) to organize
parliamentary control and to accumulate monitoring specific human capital. Whether or not po-
litical factions are formally allowed to initiate parliamentary instruments, they can strategically
coordinate the use of these individual tools to put pressure on the executive body.
New parties entering parliament also play a relevant role with respect to parliamentary control
(Kalke and Raschke 2004). Since they have to distinguish themselves from the other parties and
need to become known, members of parliament belonging to a new party have an incentive to
control government more strictly. Since new parties are often elected because of dissatisfaction
with the government or with the parties in power, new parties are also expected to use more
parliamentary control instruments to actively control government behavior.
Form of government
Parliamentary democracies experience minority governments and governments that are formed
by a single party, a coalition or even a coalition of major parties. These different constellations
give rise to a large set of strategic considerations when deciding about parliamentary control
activity. It is argued that members of the majority party or coalition parties have little incentive
to effectively control their own governmental representatives. According to this argument, the
larger the majority or the coalition is, the less frequently parliamentary control instruments
are used. However, the constituency of the governing majority, for the most part, holds its
representatives responsible for the provision of public goods, who thus have an incentive to
control the efficient provision of public services and to use the respective instruments.
It might further be argued that parties in opposition have stronger incentives to execute mon-
itoring when they can distinguish themselves from a large fraction of representatives; e.g., in
situations with coalitions of major parties. Moreover, within coalitions of major parties, over-
sight incentives might be strengthened as these coaltions cover a large ideological spectrum.
Since such constellations are not considered to be permanent, major parties want to signal their
independence by controlling the government, respectively the government representatives of the
coalition partner. Summing up, no definite theoretical predictions are possible about how any
one form of government is related to the overall level of parliamentary oversight.
Other factors influencing the use of parliamentary control instruments
Some use of parliamentary oversight instruments must be seen as an expression of parliamentary
activism (see, e.g., Andeweg and Irwin 1993) not intended to control the government. Factors
driving parliamentary activism are not investigated any further but are assumed to contribute
to the general level of the use of control instruments. Level effects are also expected from the
size of the legislature and from the length of the legislative periods. In larger legislatures more
people are involved in parliamentary oversight, and this is expected to increase the overall use
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of parliamentary control instruments (overcompensating any free-rider incentive). Similarly,
a longer legislative period, respectively a larger number of parliamentary sessions, offer more
possibilities for parliamentary oversight. Parliaments entrusted with designing the constitution
and establishing the most fundamental institutions might concentrate on legislating. The neces-
sary implementation of new law, for example, might, however, also provoke more parliamentary
oversight.
2.5 Hypotheses on Parliamentary Oversight
In order to summarize the main arguments and to prepare for the empirical analysis, the key
hypotheses are formulated:
Hypothesis 1: The lower the individual costs of parliamentary control are, the more frequently
instruments of oversight (given the level of political competition) will be used. Public servants in
parliament are identified as legislators with lower control costs; in particular, due to their public
sector-specific information advantage. Accordingly, in legislatures with a larger proportion of
public servants, there is more parliamentary oversight.
Hypothesis 2: The more parliamentarians are personally held accountable due to electoral re-
straints, the more effort they invest in parliamentary oversight. A mixed-member electoral
system is identified as one where more legislators face the competition of single-member dis-
tricts than in pure proportional representation. Accordingly, members of a legislature who are
selected under a mixed-member system make more frequent use of instruments of parliamentary
oversight.
Hypothesis 3: Politicians with low individual monitoring costs increase their control activities
more than politicians with high costs if electoral competition is increased. Accordingly, there is
more engagement in parliamentary oversight if the fraction of public servants in parliament is
high and a fraction of the legislature is elected through a majoritarian procedure.
Furthermore, in legislatures with at least one new party, a more frequent use of instruments of
parliamentary oversight is expected. No specific hypotheses are formulated for constitutional
parliaments and for the form of government as parliamentarians face countervailing incentives
to engage in oversight.
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3 Institutional Background
The theoretical arguments are studied for the specific situation of public servants in German
Laender parliaments.7 In Germany, due to centralization at the federal and European level,
the remaining core competencies of the German Laender are in the areas of education, cultural
affairs, administrative law, police law, municipal law, constitutional law of the Land, and media
law. Thus most of these concern public service issues. An important competence is also the
actual formation of the implementation rules of federal laws (Ausfu¨hrungsbestimmungen). The
latter aspect implies that most sovereign duties are executed by the public service of the Laen-
der or local authorities. Both of these are subject to the supervision of Laender parliaments.
By means of executive control, almost every (political) issue may be subject to parliamentary
attention, respectively to parliamentary oversight. In fact, most of the time and resources of the
parliamentary process at the Laender level (and significantly more than at the federal level) are
devoted to controlling government behavior rather than to legislating (Patzelt 2006).
Parliamentarians in the German Laender have access to different instruments to pursue their
oversight mandate in order to hold the government accountable. The major means for obtaining
information and controlling government and public-service behavior are the power to pass the
budget (Budgethoheit), the institution of committees of inquiry and parliamentary inquiry rights.
Besides these instruments, there also exists the constructive vote of no confidence, which is
a means of last resort for removing office holders of the executive branch.8 Some of these
instruments are stipulated in the constitution. More commonly, they are part of the rules
that govern parliamentary procedures (such sets of rules are called standing orders or rules of
7The public service in Germany includes all employees that receive public pay and have a
work contract under public law. We are aware that there are differences in the legal status
between the different occupational (sub)categories of the public service (i.e., public servants
(Beamte) or employees in the public service (Angestellte im o¨ffentlichen Dienst). However, for
the scope of our analysis, there are no important differences regarding the conditions to run for
parliament or the conditions of guaranteed reemployment after the termination of a mandate.
Professionals from the public service, typically represented in parliaments, come from professions
in education (i.e., teachers or university professors), are police officials, magistrates, ministers,
political public servants, (senior-) officials in various fields of public administration, mayors and
district administrators (Landra¨te) or employees of public enterprises. Privatizations, such as
the major privatizations in the 1990s of Deutsche Post and Deutsche Telekom are taken into
account. In 2005, the fraction of public servants in the working population amounted to 13.3%.
8Further institutions to control government behavior include, for example, the right to de-
mand the attendance of members of the government (Ministerzitierung), public auditing insti-
tutions (Rechnungsho¨fe), specialized offices of ombudspersons (e.g., the commissioner for the
armed forces), petition committees, and the judicial review (Normenkontrollklage) before the
German constitutional court (for an overview, see Schindler 1999).
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procedures).
We focus on the parliamentary instruments of inquiry or interpellation. Parliamentary inquiries
oblige the executive body to provide the information or explanation requested (Article 20, para-
graph 2, of the German constitution). This includes access to documentations, unsolicited
assistance and ministerial reports, and written comments. In addition, government declarations
have to accommodate parliamentary control matters (Reutter 2008).
The German parliaments generally allow three types of parliamentary inquiry: major and mi-
nor interpellations and oral inquiries. Box A.1 in the appendix provides procedural details for
their application. Major and minor interpellations focus on the effective use of public funds.
Parliamentarians use interpellations to collect information and to demand explanations, justi-
fications and assessments of the conditions that prevail in the various fields of public service
activity. Moreover, interpellations often deal with the impact of reforms and demand from the
government to thoroughly clarify its stance on the measures taken. Apart from questions that
critically examine executive behavior, interpellations also include questions aiming at govern-
ments’ intended policy actions. Typical areas of concern are the judiciary, the police, education,
infrastructure, and the public administration. Oral inquiries are also submitted in order to col-
lect information and to demand explanations. However, they often address current issues and
matters related to news events. An example for every instrument is presented in Box A.2 in the
appendix.
Summing up, procedural rules that force the government to react and the threat of launching
a debate or a transformation into an interpellation of higher order generating media attention
affirm the role of interpellations as strong parliamentary oversight devices. Major interpellations
address issues of broader scope and contain questions reaching from constitutional concerns
to government’s intentions regarding possible reforms. Minor interpellations aim at narrower
issues. They form the classical tool for efficiency control. For this instrument, the informational
advantage of individual public servants in parliament is expected to be particularly relevant. In




The empirical analysis is based on a newly collected dataset on the use of parliamentary control
instruments in all the parliaments of the German Laender and city states as well as on the
factors influencing parliamentary oversight. Currently, there are sixteen German states. Up
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to the German reunification, there were eleven states, the so-called old German Laender. The
empirical analysis covers the time period since the late 1940s (with a maximum of 63 years for
Bavaria and a minimum of twelve years for the new German Laender).
Parliamentary instruments of inquiry
Data on the aggregate use of interpellations and inquiries is collected from various sources.
For some Laender and some time periods, descriptive studies in political science offer data.9
Additional information is from parliamentary handbooks (Volkshandbu¨cher) and from the par-
liamentary online documentation systems of the Laender, which provide detailed information
for recent legislative periods. In order to collect information on early legislative periods, we
analyzed parliamentary printed matter or protocols as well as government declarations. These
materials were provided by the parliamentary information services.
For the three instruments, i.e. major and minor interpellations and the oral inquiries, there is
information for 152, 153 and 133 legislative periods respectively.10 There is no information for
some early legislative periods due to data availability. Some Laender introduced oral inquiries
only in later periods. We take this into account in the empirical analysis as oral inquiries are
likely to have replaced some minor interpellations.
Descriptive statistics for each of the instruments is presented in Table A.1 in the appendix.
On average, the number of major interpellations submitted within a legislative period is 66.6.
For minor interpellations, the average number is 1,663.6, and for oral inquiries, the respective
number is 545.9. Depending on the Land and the length of the legislative period, there is a large
variation in the use of the instruments. In Schleswig-Holstein, there were no major interpellations
submitted in the short legislative period beginning in 1987 and unexpectedly finishing only some
months later in 1988. The highest number of major interpellations (i.e., 237) were submitted in
the 16th legislative period in Hamburg (1997-2001). The smallest number for minor answer is
seven for the 3rd legislative period in Lower Saxony (1955-1959). The largest number is 12,278
for the 4th legislative period in Saxony (2005-2009). The respective numbers for oral inquiries
are 3 (Schleswig-Holstein, 1987-1988) and 2,499 (Berlin, 1990-1995).
Figure 1 traces the number of minor interpellations submitted in all the German Laender par-
liaments over time. In the case of Hesse, for example, data for 17 subsequent legislative periods
is available covering the period from 1946 to 2008. In the first legislative period, 283 minor
interpellations are observed; the peak, with 2,446 submissions, was reached in the 9th legislative
9In particular, we draw on Kalke and Raschke (2004), Mielke and Reutter (2004), Raschke
and Kalke (1994), Reutter (2008), and Scha¨fer (2005).
10Regular legislative terms last either four or five years. Due to constructive votes of no
confidence and coalition instabilities, some legislative periods turned out to be shorter.
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period (1978-82) and in the last and shorter period (2008), 257 were submitted. For the old
Laender with longer time series, neither any clear similarity nor any kind of time trend can be
observed. For the new German Laender parliaments, the emerging picture is also heterogeneous.
The profiles for the other two control instruments are included in Figures A.1 and A.2 in the
appendix.
[Figure 1 about here]
In collecting the data on the three parliamentary inquiry instruments, we encountered some
challenges. In some cases, contradictory information about the number of submitted inquiries
exists. The number of minor interpellations and oral inquiries varies because some researchers
and officials count only the number of inquiries that have received replies. In some sources, it is
not taken into account that inquiries not replied to in time can be transformed into higher order
interpellations and that an unexpected termination of a legislative period may cause unanswered
inquiries. As far as we noticed such ambiguities, we clarified the observations in question with
the help of the parliamentary information services.
Explanatory factors
In the empirical analysis, we take into account a large set of factors that are theoretically related
to parliamentary oversight.11
o Fraction of public servants: This variable captures the percentage of parliamentarians
with a previous or concurrent occupation in the public service. Data is from Braendle and
Stutzer (2010). On average, 40.48 % of the members of the Laender parliament have a
public sector background. The fraction was lowest in Lower Saxony (1947); i.e., 10.6 %,
and highest in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (1988); i.e., 61.6%.
o Mixed-member electoral system: This variable for the electoral system (based on Massicotte
2003) is coded 1 (0 otherwise) if some candidates are directly elected while others enter
via a party list.12 The reference category is a strictly proportional electoral system. In
11We describe the explanatory variables for the largest sample; i.e., for minor interpellations.
12In most Laender with a mixed members system, each voter has two votes, a first vote and
a second vote. The first vote is directly attributed to a candidate that represents the electoral
district. The candidate that obtains the majority of first votes in the districts is elected to
parliament by a direct mandate. This is the majority voting component in the electoral system.
With the second vote, the citizens vote for the party which may then, in accordance with its share
of party votes, send candidates from closed party lists to parliament. This is the proportional
voting component in the electoral system. For a detailed description of the electoral system
including the discussion of bonus seats (U¨berhangmandate), compensatory additional list seats
(Ausgleichsmandate) and further differences between the Laender, see Massicotte (2003).
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2010, 14 Laender apply a mixed-member electoral system. Within our sample period,
three Laender have switched from a strictly proportional electoral system to one with a
majoritarian component. No switches in the other direction have been observed. The
relative frequency of a mixed-member electoral system in the data set is 73.9%.
o New party : If at least one new party enters parliament in a legislative period, the variable
takes value 1 (0 otherwise). This is the case for roughly one third of the legislative periods
in our sample.
o Constitutional parliament : Constitutional parliament is given and coded 1 (0 otherwise)
if the parliament is entrusted with designing the constitution.
o Coalition government by major parties: The variable for the form of government (based
on Manow and Wettengel 2006) takes value 1 (0 otherwise) if the government is supported
by a coalition of the major parties (CDU, Christian Democratic Party and SPD, Social
Democratic Party). In 14.4% of the legislative periods, the government was composed of
the two major parties.
o Legislative period shorter than 1.5 years: If the legislative period turns out to be shorter
than 1.5 years, the variable takes value 1 (0 otherwise).
o Legislative period between 1.5 and 3 years: The variable takes the value 1 (0 otherwise) if
the legislative period turns out to last between 1.5 years and 3 years.
o Legislative period regular 5 years: If the regular legislative period lasts 5 years, the variable
takes value 1 (0 otherwise).
o Oral inquiries exercisable: If the instrument of oral inquiriy is introduced separately and
is exercisable, the variable takes value 1 (0 otherwise).
4.2 Results
The results are presented in several steps. We start with an overview of the partial correlations
for the identified determinants of the three parliamentary control instruments. Subsequently,
we focus on the analysis on minor interpellations. The use of this instrument comes closest to
our theoretical considerations. Minor interpellations are mainly used for efficiency control of
government and public service behavior and are individually attributable (as opposed to major
interpellations). We report the results for a series of specifications (including an instrumental
variable specification) based on different assumptions about unobserved factors in our time-
series, cross-section data. In a last step, we provide estimation results for the interaction effect
between the fraction of public servants and the electoral system.
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Baseline Estimations
Table 1 presents the first set of results for the full data sample including all three control
instruments and observations from the old and the new German Laender. The dependent
variable is the number of submitted interpellations or inquiries in log terms. We thus estimate
specifications of a semilogarithmic functional form. Accordingly, the coefficient for continuous
variables shows the percentage change in the untransformed dependent variable per one-unit
change in the explanatory factor. However, this interpretation of the estimated correlation
coefficients does not hold for categorical (dummy) variables. As these coefficients are biased,
we also report estimated mean coefficients (in square brackets) that are consistent, close to the
unbiased results, and follow the interpretation of coefficients for continuous variables (Kennedy
1981).
[Table 1 about here]
As there might be time-invariant factors in some Laender that are not captured by our inde-
pendent variables but that systematically affect the use of parliamentary control instruments,
we take unobserved Laender-specific variation into account, including Laender fixed effects in
our baseline estimations. Examples for such factors might be a Laender parliament-specific po-
litical culture or simply the size of the legislature that influences the use of the different control
instruments.
For all parliamentary control instruments, we find that a higher fraction of public servants is
related to more parliamentary oversight ceteris paribus. With regard to the size of the effects,
a one percentage point increase in the fraction of public servants in parliament is associated,
on average, with a 1.0% increase in the number of major interpellations submitted. For minor
interpellations, the effect is 8.1% and for oral inquiries, 2.8% respectively. These results are
consistent with Hypothesis 1, which emphasizes the lower individual control costs of public
servants elected to parliament (given the level of political competition). Moreover, they also fit
the qualitative analysis of Schrode (1977), who concludes that parliamentarians with a public
sector background are more active and more critical in controlling government behavior during
plenary debates than other parliamentarians.
For the further explanatory factors, we find the following partial correlations. The variable
capturing a mixed-member electoral system is positively correlated with the execution of par-
liamentary oversight. This points in the theoretically expected direction – the more parliamen-
tarians to be held personally accountable, the more effort is invested in parliamentary oversight.
However, the coefficients have to be interpreted with caution. First, the effect is only statisti-
cally significant in the case of oral inquiries. Second, it has to be taken into account that the
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coefficient is identified based on changes in the electoral system in only three German Laender.
For the variable capturing constitutional parliaments, statistically significant partial correlations
are observed. However, the picture that emerges is ambiguous for the different instruments of
parliamentary control and we abstain from an ex post interpretation. It indicates that in legisla-
tures that are entrusted with designing the fundamental institutions, particular (idiosyncratic)
oversight dynamics are at work.
Legislatures with at least one new party are related to more frequent use of parliamentary
oversight instruments. In a legislature with at least one new party, the instrument of major in-
terpellations is, on average, used 15.9% more frequently. The existence of a coalition government
by major parties is associated with a more frequent use of all parliamentary instruments. Not
surprisingly, the length of the legislative period is statistically significantly related to the use of
parliamentary control instruments. If we standardize the dependent variable by the length of
the legislative period, qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results are obtained. With
regard to the separate introduction of oral inquiries, the partial correlation indicates that there
is a substantial substitution effect of oral inquiries for minor interpellations. The number of
submitted minor interpellations is more than halved. Together, the explanatory factors account
for 58.9% of the variation in the dependent variable major interprellations, 61.8% in the vari-
able minor interpellations and 39.3% in the variable oral inquiries. The F-test indicates that
the independent variables are jointly statistically significant.
Robustness Analyses
In Table 2, we report additional estimations for a series of specifications under different assump-
tions about unobserved factors affecting parliamentary oversight. We concentrate on the use of
minor interpellations, the main instrument for efficiency control. The respective results for the
other oversight instruments are reported in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix.
[Table 2 about here]
In order to allow comparisons, Panel I repeats the baseline specification with Laender fixed
effects, now restricted to the sample of the old German Laender. The specification in Panel
II furthermore controls for unmeasured time-specific effects on the use of minor interpellations
that might be correlated with some of the independent variables. For instance, there might
be strongly disputed (political) issues in some periods that give rise to interpellations across
Laender. We take unobserved time-specific variation into account, including decade fixed effects.
The estimation result is still consistent with Hypothesis 1: a one percentage point increase in the
fraction of public servants is related to a 2.8% increase in the number of minor interpellations
submitted in a legislative period. While the size of the effect is smaller than in Panel I, it is
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still highly statistically significant. For the other two instruments, we find that the variation
that is related to the fraction of public servants in parliament in Panel I can also be statistically
accounted for by time effects (see Tables A.2 and A.3).
All estimations, so far, are based on the assumption that all the unexplained parts of the
use of the oversight instruments (i.e., the residuals) are independent across time and space.
There are, however, reasons why a positive residual for a specific legislative period is positively
correlated with the residual of the next period. One argument concerns the electoral advantage
of incumbents. As the average length of stay in German parliaments is about two and a half
periods (see, e.g., Mielke and Reutter 2004), the personal composition of one legislative period
remains partly the same in the following period. Accordingly, it might be argued that the use
of parliamentary oversight is partially influenced by the inertia of the personal composition of
legislatures and the oversight culture that is carried over. An inspection of the results shows
autocorrelation. We take this aspect into account by including a lagged dependent variable
in Column III.13 Furthermore, we calculate panel corrected standard errors taking into account
panel heteroscedasticity. This is recommended by the differential variation of the residuals across
Laender parliaments. As theoretically expected, there is inertia in the use of parliamentary
oversight instruments. According to Specification III, the elasticity with regard to the lagged
dependent variable is 0.548. With regard to the political selection variable, a one percentage
point increase in the fraction of public servants in parliament is related to a 3.9% increase in
the number of minor interpellations submitted. The respective figures for major interpellations
and oral inquiries are 1.5% and 2.9% (see Tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix). Furthermore, a
mixed-member electoral system is related to a more frequent use of minor interpellations.
In Panel IV, a last robustness check is executed following an instrumental variable approach.
This allows for the possibility that a third variable drives the fraction of public servants in
parliament as well as oversight activities and thus generates a spurious correlation between the
two variables. For example, a political scandal may increase voters’ demand for parliamen-
tary oversight, and simultaneously voters may also elect more public servants as legislators. To
allow a consistent estimation, we instrument the fraction of public servants with the respec-
tive institutional determinants that are not themselves explanatory variables for parliamentary
oversight. These instruments are taken form Braendle and Stutzer (2010). Column IV reports
the results of the second stage of the two-stage least-squares estimation.14 The effect is less
13Since the variable covering constitutional parliaments always coincides with the first obser-
vation in a Laender-time series, it is dropped in the third specification.
14The result of the first stage estimation for the fraction of public servants (standard er-
rors in parentheses) is as follows: -0.056* strict incompatibility (0.035) -0.045* soft incompat-
ibility (0.041) + 0.152* strict incompatibility x fulltime parliament (0.027) + 0.108* pension
benefit (0.020) + 0.143* abeyance compensation (0.026) + 0.148*automatic promotion (0.04)
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precisely estimated but again statistically significantly related to a more frequent use of minor
interpellations.
Altogether, we find a robust positive effect of the fraction on public servants on the use of minor
interpellations.
Interaction Effect with the Electoral System
Hypothesis 3, based on our theoretical framework, predicts that public servants in parliament
face a stronger incentive to take advantage of their specific skills and information for parliamen-
tary oversight if they are held personally accountable. This hypothesis is tested by adding an
interaction term between the fraction of public servants and the presence of a mixed member
electoral system to the baseline specification. The results are presented in Table 3. The variable
for the fraction of public servants is mean-adjusted. Thus the coefficient for the dummy variable
mixed member electoral system captures the level effect for the mean fraction of public servants
in parliament.
[Table 3 about here]
We find evidence that the partial correlation between the fraction of public servants and the
number of submitted minor interpellations is clearly smaller in Laender with a purely propor-
tional electoral system than in Laender with a mixed-member electoral system. For purely
proportional electoral systems, the correlation coefficients are those in the first line. For mixed
member electoral systems, the correlation coefficients for the direct effect and the interaction
effect have to be considered jointly. This means for Column II (including decade-fixed effects)
that a one percentage point increase in the fraction of public servants is related to a small 0.6%
increase in the number of submitted minor interpellations in a German Land with a purely
proportional electoral system and is related to a 3.3% increase in a Land with a mixed-member
electoral system. Qualitatively similar effects are found for major interpellations and for oral
inquiries. However, the partial correlations are less precisely estimated (see Tables A.4 and A.5).
Overall, the findings lend support to Hypothesis 3.
They are also consistent with recent findings in political economic research. Members of the
Italian parliament who are elected through a majoritarian procedure are found to be less often
absent from parliamentary sessions than list candidates (Gagliarducci et al. 2008). This indicates
that increased electoral accountability provides incentives to devote more time to the political
-0.17*other privileges (0.021). Compared to Braendle and Stutzer (2010), the restrictive effect of
the incompatibility regimes on the representation of public servants in parliament is less clearly
estimated as we lose a lot of institutional variation in legislative periods for which we do not
have data on the use of the parliamentary oversight instruments.
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mandate. Our evidence supports this thesis and draws a link to parliamentary oversight as a
key aspect of a political mandate.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we propose a framework to integrate the identity of legislators in a politico-
economic analysis of parliamentary oversight. Legislators decide about the effort they invest
in oversight activities depending on their individual control costs and the level of electoral
competition. More parliamentary oversight is expected if the political process selects legislators
with low control costs given the competition in the political market. Identity is thus understood
as heterogeneity in control costs, which is driven by processes of political selection. This approach
suggests that there is an interaction of institutions that shape legislators’ accountability to
oversee the executive branch and institutions that affect the selection of citizens into parliaments.
Our focus is on the political selection of public servants into parliament. In many countries,
there is a debate about dual employment of federal and state legislators (see, e.g., Kerns and
Martel 2008 for the U.S.). In particular, there are two countervailing arguments. On the one
hand, public servants in parliament dispose of a high degree of expertise in public service issues
and thus have lower individual costs of engaging in monitoring. Facing reelection incentives
and individual accountability, public servants in parliament can serve as a check attenuating
the information asymmetry between the executive and legislative branches of government. On
the other hand, their double role as agents in the public service and as principals that supervise
the public service in parliament generates a conflict of interest compromising their incentives for
parliamentary oversight despite any cost advantage.
Our empirical findings for the German Laender parliaments support the hypothesis of a monitor-
ing advantage of public servants. We find that a larger fraction of public servants in parliament is
statistically associated with an higher number of submitted parliamentary inquiries (our indica-
tor for parliamentary oversight). This holds, in particular, for minor interpellations. Moreover,
the effect on minor interpellations is larger in Laender in which a part of the legislators is elected
through a majoritarian procedure (rather than through a proportional procedure), increasing
individual accountability.
Based on our results, we think that it is worthwhile to study explicitly the use of oversight
instruments in order to gain insights into the actual process of parliamentary control. In a next
step, the current line of argument should be extended and outcomes of the political process
should be analyzed. Of particular interest are consequences of the composition of legislatures
for the allocative efficiency of the public sector as well as its productivity. Altogether, the
insights should provide a better understanding of when policy outcomes are more the result of
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Use of Minor Interpellations in German Laender Parliaments
Note: The legislative periods are numbered backwards in order to obtain comparable time-series.
The 17th legislative period always stands for the latest legislative period.
Sources: See Table A.1.
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Table 1: Determinants of Parliamentary Control in the German Laender
Baseline estimations for all Laender
Dependent variables: Log of the number of the different parliamentary control instruments
Major Minor Oral
interpellations interpellations inquiries
Fraction of public servants .010** .081*** .028***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Mixed-member electoral .228 .404 1.267***
system (0.215) (0.344) (0.386)
[.228] [.412] [2.297]
Constitutional parliament .429** –.746** .720*
(0.199) (0.319) (0.383)
[.503] [-.549] [.909]
New party .151* .079 .077
(0.082) (0.130) (0.143)
[.159] [.073] [.069]
Coalition government .446*** .367* .583**
by major parties (0.127) (0.203) (0.226)
[.550] [.414] [.747]
Legislative period – 2.534*** –1.914*** –1.773***
shorter than 1.5 years (0.210) (0.336) (0.442)
[-.922] [-.861] [-.846]
Legislative period –.650*** –.338 –.502
between 1.5 and 3 years (0.199) (0.318) (0.409)
[-.488] [-.322] [-.443]
Legislative period .206* .632*** .645***
regular 5 years (0.119) (0.189) (0.204)
[.220] [.847] [.866]
Oral inquiries exercisable .013 –.719*
(0.250) (0.401)
[.018] [-.551]
Laender fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.589 0.618 0.393
N 152 153 133
Notes: See next page.
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Continuation of Table 1.
Notes: Partial correlations from OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
In all estimations for the log number of major interpellations, we used a Ln(major interpellation
+ 1) transformation in order to make use of the one legislative period, in which no major
interpellation was submitted).
The values in square brackets accommodate the fact that we use a semilogarithmic functional
form with dummy variables. The coefficients of the percentage change for all dummy variables
are computed using the post estimation Stata command “logdummy”.
Sources: See Table A.1.
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Table 2: Determinants of Minor Interpellations in the Old German Laender
Refined estimations
Dependent variable: Log of the number of minor interpellations
I II III IV
Lagged Ln(number of .548***
minor interpellations) (0.070)
Fraction of public servants .084*** .028*** .039*** .112***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
Mixed-member electoral .397 .205 .486* .139
system (0.369) (0.281) (0.281) (0.396)
[.389] [.180] [.563] [.063]
Constitutional parliament –.575 –.004 –.611
(0.527) (0.610) (0.554)
[–.510] [–.173] [–.534]
New party .029 .081 .093 .014
(0.136) (0.102) (0.101) (0.143)
[.020] [.079] [.092] [.035]
Coalition government .308 .294 .180 .409
by major parties (0.247) (0.189) (0.161) (0.261)
[.320] [.318] [.182] [.455]
Oral inquiries exercisable –.691 –1.241*** –.447 –1.054**
(0.461) (0.346) (0.290) (0.497)
[–.550] [-.728] [-.387] [-.692]
Control for length of Yes Yes Yes Yes
legislative periods
Laender fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects Yes
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.632 0.815 0.849 0.735
N 134 134 122 134
Notes: Specifications I-II: Partial correlations from OLS regressions. Specification III: Panel-
corrected standard errors taking into account panel heteroskedasticity. Specification IV: Instru-
mental variable estimation. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Due to one gap, Specification III includes only 122 observations instead of 123.
For further explanations see the notes in Table 1.
Sources: See Table A.1.
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Table 3: Interaction Effect of the Electoral System and the Fraction of Public Servants
on Minor Interpellations in the Old German Laender
Dependent variables: Log of the number of minor interpellations
I II
Mean-adjusted fraction of public servants .057*** .006
(0.013) (0.011)
Mixed-member electoral system .427 .205
(0.359) (0.271)
[.437] [.183]
Mean-adjusted fraction of public servants .040*** .033***
x mixed-member electoral system (0.015) (0.011)
Constitutional parliament –.674 .162
(0.515) (0.591)
[–.554] [–.013]
New party .042 .087
(0.133) (0.098)
[.034] [.086]
Coalition government by major parties .366 .362*
(0.241) (0.184)
[.401] [.412]
Oral inquiries exercisable –.683 –1.201***
(0.448) (0.334)
[–.543] [–.715]
Control for length of legislative periods Yes Yes
Laender fixed effects Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects Yes
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000
R2 0.654 0.830
N 134 134
Notes: Partial correlations from OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
For further explanations see the notes in Table 1.
Sources: See Table A.1.
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Appendix
Box A.1: Control Instruments in German Laender Parliaments
Major interpellation
Major interpellations (often called grosse Anfrage or Interpellation) are addressed to the gov-
ernment, are submitted in the form of a detailed written request to the president of the
parliament, and have to be signed by a parliamentary group, a faction or by a minimum of
five to fifteen legislators.15 The government is requested to provide a written reply within six
weeks. After a reply is received, the interpellation is placed on the plenary agenda, and if the
submitting group insists, a debate must take place. Prior to a debate, one of the questioners
is allowed to present additional arguments backing the submitted interpellation. After the
debate, parliamentarians can induce a motion for a resolution to express their opinion on the
subject of the interpellation or the government’s reply to it.
Minor interpellation
Minor interpellations (often called kleine or schriftliche Anfrage) are submitted by individual
legislators in the form of a detailed written request containing up to ten specific questions.
The government is expected to reply to the minor interpellation, in writing, within two weeks.
The answer is published as parliamentary printed matter. If a minor interpellation is not
answered in time, rules of procedure stipulate a transformation into a major interpellation.
Oral inquiry
The procedure for oral inquiries is similar to the one mentioned for minor interpellations.
They are also submitted by individual legislators in the form of a written request containig
up to five specific questions. They must be sent some days before the next plenary debate
takes place (previous notice). Their authors read them out and the government has to give
an oral answer. Moreover, follow-up questions are allowed, and the author is asked to express
his or her (dis)satisfaction with the answer provided. If oral questions are not answered, the
government has to deliver a written reply; otherwise, it is put forward to a minor interpellation.
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Figure A.1: Use of Major Interpellations in German Laender Parliaments
Note: The legislative periods are numbered backwards in order to obtain comparable time-series.
The 17th legislative period always stands for the latest legislative period.
Sources: See Table A.1.
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Box A.2: Examples for the Different Parliamentary Control Instruments
Major interpellation
The example of a major interpellation is taken from the 14th legislative period of the parliament
of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. It was executed on February 26, 2007 (parliamentary printed matter
14/964) and submitted by the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The parliamentarians who
explicitly signed were Vogt, Gall and Stickelberger.
The major interpellation was eight pages long. The reply was 30-pages long and contained
detailed information and clarifications. The first part of the interpellation is reproduced in a
rough translation.
Topic: Consequences of the administrative reform in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
School administration
1. How does the ministerial administration evaluate the outcome of the reform of the edu-
cational system so far?
2. What consequences does the restructuring of the public school oversight authorities have
on the quality of oversight?
3. What concrete measures does the education ministry implement to guarantee the new
quality standards in schools following the reform?
4. What is the impact of the reform on the public education budget? Has the public spending
constraint already been reached?
5. How large has the reduction in employment in public education administration been so
far? How will this develop in the upcoming years, and what impact will the policy of
ensuring the quality of oversight have on public education?
6. How does the public education administration achieve the reduction in the number of
public education employees and guarantee personnel transfer for the staff that have to
leave, and what measures are employed to prevent cases of hardship?
7. What are the criteria for evaluating the educational system reform; who conducts this
evaluation; and how is it conducted? What costs are incurred in the process?
8. Which criteria are used to measure the reforms success?
In the same major interpellation, similar inquiries were made concerning the forestry commis-
sion and administration reforms regarding land consolidation, road construction and economic
control services.
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Continuation of Box A.2
Minor interpellation
The example of a minor interpellation is taken from the 4th legislative period of the parliament
of Mecklenburg-Lower-Pomerania. It was executed on November 26, 2003 (parliamentary
printed matter 4/919). The interpellation was submitted by Harry Glawe, a member of
parliament with a public service background.
Topic: Status of employee ill-health in the ministerial administration of Mecklenburg-Lower-
Pomerania
1. The government ministries of Mecklenburg-Lower-Pomerania conduct a very different
policy regarding the reporting of employee ill-health statistics. Are there particular rea-
sons?
2. Do flexible vacation days influence the time structure of employee ill-health absences?
Are the absences recorded, and if so, how detailed are the records?
3. How many members of staff are ill for more than six weeks (give as a percentage also)?
Please give detailed information for each ministry. How has the number of absences of
more than six weeks owing to ill-health developed over the past five years?
4. What is the annual average number of ill staff? What is the ratio of annually ill staff to
annual working hours?
5. What criteria does the government apply in appraising the average level of staff ill in
relation to the annual working hours?
6. What criteria does the government apply in appraising a comparison between the different
ill-health statistics of the individual ministries?
7. How do these figures compare with parallel government institutions in other German
regions?
34
Continuation of Box A.2
Oral inquiry
The example of an oral inquiry is taken from the 4th legislative period of the parliament
of Mecklenburg-Lower-Pomerania. It was executed on June 29, 2006 (parliamentary printed
matter 4/2342). The interpellation was submitted by Dr. Ulrich Born and directed towards
the economics ministry.
Topic: The competitiveness of Mecklenburg-Lower-Pomerania
In a recent study of the Bertelsmann Foundation (2005) on the competitiveness of the Ger-
man Laender, the state of Mecklenburg-Lower-Pomerania ranks penultimate with regard to its
economic attractiveness as well as with regard to its political attractiveness (the political effort
undertaken to improve economic conditions).
1. How does the government assess these results?
2. What concrete strategies are envisaged for improving the position of Mecklenburg-Lower-
Pomerania in the near future?
Note: The examples are not translated literally but with regard to content.
Sources: Parliamentary online documentation services.
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent and Independent Variables
Number of LPs Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Dependent variables
Major interpellations 152 66.583 53.56 0 237
Minor interpellations 153 1663.634 1723.853 7 12278
Oral inquiries 133 545.871 546.931 3 2499
Independent variables
Fraction of public servants 153 40.481 10.363 10.60 61.60
Personal proportional representation 153 .739 .492 0 1
Constitutional parliament 153 .059 .236 0 1
New party 153 .333 .473 0 1
Coalition government by major parties 153 .144 .352 0 1
LP shorter than 1.5 years 153 .037 .178 0 1
LP lasting between 1.5 and 3 years 153 .039 .195 0 1
LP lasting regular 4 years 153 .686 .465 0 1
LP lasting regular 5 years 153 .242 .429 0 1
Oral inquiries exercised 153 .346 .477 0 1
Note: LP stands for legislative period.
Sources: For the dependent variables, see Kalke and Raschke (2004), Mielke and Reutter (2004),
Raschke and Kalke (1994), Reutter (2008), Scha¨fer (2005), and various parliamentary handbooks
and parliamentary documentation systems.
For the independent variables, see Braendle and Stutzer (2010) for the fraction of public servants,
Massicotte (2003) for the coding of the variable electoral system, and Manow and Wettengel
(2006) for the coding of the form of government. For all other variables, the coding is based on
information from the Bundes- or Landeswahlleiter.
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Figure A.2: Use of Oral Inquiries in German Laender Parliaments
Note: The legislative periods are numbered backwards in order to obtain comparable time-series.
The 17th legislative period always stands for the latest legislative period.
Sources: See Table A.1.
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Table A.2: Determinants of Major Interpellations in the Old German Laender
Refined estimations
Dependent variable: Log of the number of major interpellations
I II III IV
Lagged Ln(number of .308***
major interpellations) (0.061)
Fraction of public servants .010** –.001 .015*** .007
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007)
Mixed-member electoral .296 .389* .111 .320
system (0.228) (0.230) (0.202) (0.233)
[.309] [.437] [.095] [.340]
Constitutional parliament .597* .640 .601*
(0.326) (0.499) (0.326)
[.723] [.674] [.729]
New party .167* .149* .247*** .168**
(0.084) (0.831) (0.072) (0.084)
[.177] [.156] [.276] [.178]
Coalition government .455*** .513*** .350*** .446***
by major parties (0.152) (0.155) (0.115) (0.154)
[.558] [.650] [.410] [.543]
Oral inquiries exercisable .129 .291 –.291 .163
(0.284) (0.283) (0.200) (0.292)
[.092] [.286] [–.267] [.128]
Control for length of Yes Yes Yes Yes
legislative periods
Laender fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects Yes
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.613 0.659 0.866 0.812
N 133 133 119 133
Notes: Specifications I-II: Partial correlations from OLS regressions. Specification III: Panel-
corrected standard errors taking into account panel heteroskedasticity. Specification IV: Instru-
mental variable estimation. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Due to three gaps in the sample, Specification III includes only 119 instead of 122 observations.
For further explanations see the notes in Table 1.
Sources: See Table A.1.
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Table A.3: Determinants of Oral Inquiries in the Old German Laender
Refined estimations
Dependent variable: Log of the number of oral inquiries
I II III IV
Lagged Ln(number of .271***
oral inquiries) (0.091)
Fraction of public servants .031*** .007 .029*** .032***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.012)
Mixed-member electoral 1.39*** 1.35*** .762* 1.37***
system (0.458) (0.445) (0.413) (0.466)
[2.616] [2.505] [.966] [2.534]
Constitutional parliament 1.224 .614 1.23
(0.932) (0.947) (0.932)
[1.203] [.180] [1.211]
New party .068 .114 .151 .067
(0.157) (0.153) (0.119) (0.157)
[.058] [.107] [.155] [.056]
Coalition government .668** .761** .518*** .676**
by major parties (0.293) (0.304) (0.154) (0.296)
[.869] [1.045] [.659] [.882]
Control for length of Yes Yes Yes Yes
legislative periods
Laender fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects Yes
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.407 0.487 0.902 0.823
N 114 114 102 114
Notes: Specifications I-II: Partial correlations from OLS regressions. Specification III: Panel-
corrected standard errors taking into account panel heteroskedasticity. Specification IV: Instru-
mental variable estimation. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Due to two gaps in the sample, Specification III includes only 102 instead of 104 observations.
For further explanations see the notes in Table 1.
Sources: See Table A.1.
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Table A.4: Interaction Effect of the Electoral System and the Fraction of Public Servants on
Major Interpellations in the Old German Laender
Dependent variable: Log of the number of major interpellations
I II
Mean-adjusted fraction of public servants .006 –.006
(0.008) (0.010)
Mixed-member electoral system .300 .389*
(0.229) (0.230)
[.315] [.437]
Mean-adjusted fraction of public servants .006 .008
x mixed-member electoral system (0.009) (0.009)
Constitutional parliament .582* .682
(0.327) (0.502)
[.697] [.744]
New party .169** .150*
(0.085) (0.083)
[.179] [.158]
Coalition government by major parties .464*** .530***
(0.153) (0.156)
[.571] [.678]
Oral inquiries exercisable .130 .302
(0.285) (0.284)
[.093] [.299]
Control for length of legislative periods Yes Yes
Laender fixed effects Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects Yes
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000
R2 0.614 0.662
N 133 133
Notes: Partial correlations from OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
For further explanations see the notes in Table 1.
Sources: See Table A.1.
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Table A.5: Interaction Effect of the Electoral System and the Fraction of Public Servants on
Oral Inquiries in the Old German Laender
Dependent variable: Log of the number of oral inquiries
I II
Mean-adjusted fraction of public servants .010 –.011
(0.016) (0.188)
Mixed-member electoral system 1.328*** 1.306***
(0.456) (0.443)
[2.399] [2.347]
Mean-adjusted fraction of public servants .029 .026
x mixed-member electoral system (0.019) (0.018)
Constitutional parliament .739 .186
(0.978) (0.988)
[.297] [–.261]
New party .074 .115
(0.156) (0.152)
[.064] [.109]
Coalition government by major parties .704** .805**
(0.293) (0.304)
[.938] [1.135]
Control for length of legislative periods Yes Yes
Laender fixed effects Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects Yes
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000
R2 0.422 0.498
N 114 114
Notes: Partial correlations from OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
For further explanations see the notes in Table 1.
Sources: See Table A.1.
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